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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the trial court:
1.

Lewiston State Bank, a Utah banking corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-

Appellant, was represented by Brian G. Cannell of Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen, P.C.
2.

Greenline Equipment, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, was

represented byDennis L. Mangrum and R. Collin Mangrum.
3.

John Does I-X and Jane Does I-X were not identified or represented in the

trial court proceedings.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LEWISTON STATE BANK, a Utah Bank ;)
Corporation,
])

BRIEF OF APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, ]
VQ

Vo.

J

GREENLINE EQUIPMENT, L.L.C.,
;
A Utah Limited Liability Company,
]
JOHN DOES I-X AND JANE DOES I-X, ;
1
Defendants/Appellant.
]

Appeal Case No. 20050689-SC

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This matter was
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a3(2)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Lewiston State

Bank ruling that Greenline's security interest in the collateral at issue was junior to the priority
secured position of Lewiston State Bank as a matter of law?
2.

Whether Greenline should be precluded from raising policy justifications of

fairness and efficiency in favor of extending purchase money priority status to its position with the

1

collateral for the first time on appeal when such issues were not properly presented first to the trial
court?
3.

Whether Greenline has failed to "marshal the evidence" supporting the trial court's

conclusion that its subsequent financing transaction was not a "refinance" as contemplated by Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c)?
4.

Whether the trial court committed error by failing to award attorney fees and costs

to Lewiston State Bank as an element of consequential damages resulting from Greenline's
conversion of the collateral as it was reasonably foreseeable that Lewiston State Bank would incur
such fees and costs in being forced to enforce its priority lien rights to disgorge the sale proceeds
from Greenline?
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
The priority of Lewiston State Bank's secured position in the collateral at issue and its
entitlement to prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney fees and costs as consequential damages
incurred while enforcing its lien rights were argued both by Memorandum and during the oral
arguments at the hearings on summary judgment. Lewiston State Bank filed two separate
motions for summary judgment and supported its legal positions by submitting various affidavit
testimony and exhibits. See TR atpgs. 59-68; 126; 187-211; 303-309; and 319.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review of a summary judgment as
follows:
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law
only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this court
reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according deference to the trial court's
2

legal conclusions. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah l9S9)(citing Madsen
v. BorthicK 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)).
In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, this court views the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets,
918 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c) provides as follows:
(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase
money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced,
consolidated, or restructured.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was originally brought by Lewiston State Bank seeking disgorgement of the
sale proceeds wrongfully converted and retained by Greenline and for reimbursement of all
collection costs incurred by Lewiston State Bank while enforcing its priority lien rights in the
collateral at issue.
The trial court ruled that because Greenline was not an "original creditor," had never
entered into an assignment agreement with New Holland (the PMSI holder), and there was no
clear evidence of any intent to transfer the original PMSI status held by New Holland to
Greenline, the security interest obtained by Greenline was junior to the priority position of
Lewiston State Bank. See Memorandum Decision dated February 25, 2005, TR atpg. 289,
Appellant's Addendum, pg. 11. Greenline is challenging these rulings on appeal.
The trial court awarded damages against Greenline in the amount of $78,000.00 with
interest at 10% per annum pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2)(2005), but refused to award
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attorney fees and costs to Lewiston State Bank. See Memorandum Decision dated June 29, 2005,
TR atpg. 327, Appellant's Addendum, pg. 20. Lewiston State Bank is challenging the trial
court's ruling on attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal.
This appeal is from an Order Granting Summary Judgment to Plaintiff by the Honorable
Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge, dated on or about March 16, 2005, and underlying
Memorandum Decision dated February 25, 2005. This cross-appeal is from an Order Granting
Summary Judgment to Plaintiff Re: Damages by the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court
Judge, dated on or about July 28, 2005, and underlying Memorandum Decision dated June 29,
2005.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts provide a summary background for the relief sought by Lewiston State
Bank as the Appellee/Cross-Appellant on appeal:
L

Greenline knew of Lewiston State Bank's priority claims as early as March 25,

2002, when "Mr. Jay Pickrell and Mr. Mike Phillips, representatives of Defendant Greenline,
contacted Plaintiff to determine whether Plaintiff was willing to give up its priority secured
position in the Collateral and Plaintiff responded that it was going to retain its secured positions."
See Affidavit of Anthony Jon Hall, para. 15, filed in support of Plaintiff's original Motion for
Summary Judgment, TR at pg. 61.
2.

"That on or about April 17, 2003, Mr. Ronald E. Mumford sent a demand letter to

Defendant Greenline regarding the combines, again placing said Defendant on notice of its
superior lien position regarding the combines as being part of the Collateral, and made demand for
payment or to make such Collateral available for repossession and sale by Plaintiff." A copy of
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this letter is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit "H" and is incorporated by this reference.
See Affidavit of Anthony Jon Hall, para, 14, filed in support of Plaintiffs original Motion for
Summary Judgment, TR atpg. 61.
3.

That despite the verbal and written demands upon Greenline, the sale of the collateral

to third parties was only finally disclosed in the Second Affidavit of Jay Pickrell, which is the only
notice Lewiston State Bank has received regarding the status and whereabouts of the collateral and
ultimate sale, which occurred without notice to Lewiston State Bank despite various requests for
such information. See Affidavit of Ronald E. Mumford, para. 12, filed in support of Plaintiffs
original Motion for Summary Judgment, TRatpg. 199.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c) does not provide Greenline (a third party

creditor and not an original creditor or an assignee of the original creditor) with a purchase
money security interest ("PMSI") when it paid off the original creditor and extinguished the
existing PMSI and failed to take an assignment of the original creditor's interest in the collateral
at issue.
2.

Greenline should not be allowed to argue for the first time on appeal whether the

trial court should have relied on policy justifications of fairness and equity to extend purchase
money priority status to its position with the collateral for the first time on appeal when such
issues were not presented first to the trial court. Greenline failed to preserve this issue on appeal.
3.

Greenline has failed to "marshal the evidence" supporting the trial court's

conclusion that its subsequent financing transaction was not a "refinance" that was entitled to
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purchase money priority under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c), which necessarily includes
the "extremely fact-sensitive" application of the legal standard contained therein.
4.

The trial court should have awarded Lewiston State Bank its reasonable attorney

fees and costs incurred against Greenline as consequential damages resulting from its conversion
of the collateral and sales proceeds as it was reasonably foreseeable that Lewiston State Bank
would incur such attorney fees and costs in being forced to enforce its priority lien rights to
disgorge the sale proceeds from Greenline and as Lewiston State Bank gave notice it would do
so. Lewiston State Bank should likewise be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on
appeal as a measure of consequential damages against Greenline.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §70A9a-103(6)(c) DOES NOT PROVIDE A PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST ("PMSI") TO A THIRD PARTY CREDITOR ABSENT AN
ASSIGNMENT OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR'S INTEREST.
In the Brief of Appellant, Greenline asserts that the issue of whether Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9a-103(6)(c) provides purchase money security priority to a third party creditor who
"refinances" a purchase money security interest without taking an assignment of the original
creditor's interest presents an issue of first impression of law in the State of Utah. As indicated
below, however, there are no cases or statutory authority cited by Appellant throughout the entire
United States that supports Greenline's position.
As it did during the trial court proceedings, Greenline continues to erroneously rely upon
a series of cases rejecting the "transformation theory" and confirming the "dual status theory" in
support of its position that the New Holland (original creditor) priority purchase money security
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interest ("PMSI") established on March 5, 1998, somehow survived the admitted purchase of the
equipment by Greenline and pay off of the original New Holland debt with subsequent financing
by John Deere Credit. Each of the cases cited by Greenline in the Brief of Appellant either
includes a "refinance" by the original creditor holding a PMSI or a "refinance" by a subsequent
creditor holding a perfected assignment of the PMSI from the original creditor to maintain its
priority. Greenline is NOT an original creditor holding a PMSI and is NOT a subsequent
creditor holding a perfected assignment of a PMSI from an original creditor.
In the Tenth Circuit case In re Billings v. Avco Colorado Industrial Bank, 838 F.2d 405
(10th Cir. 1988), the debtor (not an intervening secured party) attempted to invalidate the creditor's
PMSI despite the fact that such creditor provided "refinancing of a purchase money loan, by which
the old note and security agreement were cancelled and replaced by a new note and security
agreement" upon the same collateral and "the back of the loan application stated that creditor
would retain the purchase money interest." See In re Billings at 406.
In re Billings is easily distinguished as Greenline is not the original creditor that
established a PMSI and never received an assignment of the New Holland PMSI nor perfected the
same. Further, there are no documents which support the parties' intent to retain the New Holland
PMSI status such as the loan application cited in Billings. Id.
In the United States Bankruptcy Court case In re Krueger, 112 B.R. 572, 574 (N.D. Ohio
1994), the debtor attempted to invalidate the secured position of the original creditor holding the
PMSI which refinanced the debt. The Court found that "there was no evidence that refinancing
represented payment, satisfaction or discharge of loan...and refinancing was specifically
contemplated creditor's retention of the security interest."
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The facts of In re Krueger are distinguishable from the present matter as Greenline has
admitted in its pleadings and affidavits that it purchased the two combines from the Pali Brothers
for the delinquent outstanding balance owed to New Holland, which clearly satisfied and
discharged the original New Holland debt. See payoff documents, Appellant's Addendum, pgs. 4546. As stated previously, Greenline is not the original creditor that established a PMSI, never
received an assignment of the New Holland PMSI nor perfected the same, and there are no
documents which support the parties' intent to retain the New Holland PMSI status.
In the United States Bankruptcy Court case In re Short, 170 B.R. 128 (S.D.I11. 1994), the
debtor attempted to invalidate the secured position of the original credilor holding the PMSI which
refinanced the debt. The Court found that the security interest survived due to the intent of the
parties with a finding under Illinois law that a financing agency obtains a purchase money security
interest when it advances money and takes back an assignment. This cited case also refers to the
"transformation rule" and "dual status rule" which do not have any application to the present
matter as Greenline is not the original creditor that established a PMSI, never received an
assignment of the New Holland PMSI nor perfected the same, and there are no documents which
support the intent of the parties to retain the New Holland PMSI status.
In the United States Bankruptcy Court case In re Hill 226 B.R. 284 (10th Cir. 1998), the
debtor again attempted to invalidate the secured position of the subsequent creditor holding a
perfected assignment of the PMSI that had refinanced the debt. This case is distinguishable as
Greenline never received an assignment of the New Holland PMSI nor perfected the same.
The case In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 315 (E.D.Pa. 1985) clearly establishes that an
"assignee" of the PMSI may later refinance the debt and maintain its PMSI status. Again, this case
8

is distinguishable as Greenline never received an assignment of the New Holland PMSI necessary
to preserve the PMSI status.
These cases are all clearly distinguishable from the present matter where there was no
"refinance" by the original creditor holding a PMSI nor an assignment of a PMSI to any
subsequent creditor. Without an assignment of the New Holland PMSI to Greenline, such PMSI
was extinguished by Greenline's subsequent admitted purchase and pay-off of the original debt.
Greenline has failed to meet its burden of proving that it holds a PMSI under Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9a-103(7).
Greenline further errantly relies on the OFFICIAL COMMENT to the Uniform
Commercial Code § 9-103 citing circumstances of a debt being "renewed, refinanced, and
restructured" as if it is applicable to its purchase of the collateral from the Pali Brothers and
subsequent financing through John Deere Credit. While rejecting the "transformation rule," the
OFFICIAL COMMENT in paragraph 7 gives the specific example of the debt being refinanced by
the "original lender." Greenline and/or John Deere Credit are not the "original lender" in the
transaction at issue, so the reference to the OFFICIAL COMMENT has no application to
Greenline's priority claims.
It should be further noted here that the subsequent financing transaction that Greenline
claims was a "refinance" was extended to Eli M. Pali and Bart P. Pali individually and was NOT
extended to Pali Brothers as was the original debt to New Holland, resulting in a new creditor and
new debtors, which begs the question whether the transaction at issue can be properly considered a
"refinance" in the first place. See UCCfiling detail and Security Agreement, Appellant's
Addendum, pgs. 34, 43, 47-51.
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There is no question that if New Holland as the original creditor had refinanced the debt
with new loan documents that referred to the parties' intentions to maintain its original PMSI
status, or had assigned its interest in the collateral to Greenline, Lewiston State Bank's security
interest would be subordinate thereto. The evidence is clear, however, that such never occurred
in this matter and that New Holland never assigned its PMSI status. New Holland was merely
paid the debt it was owed, which extinguished the debt and the PMSI. Greenline has
significantly confused this issue by characterizing its subsequent purchase and new financing
through John Deere Credit as a "refinance."
Accordingly, the trial court appropriately ruled that because Greenline was not an "original
creditor," had never entered into an assignment agreement with New Holland (the original creditor
and PMSI holder), and there was no clear evidence of any intent to transfer the original PMSI
status held by New Holland to Greenline, the security interest obtained by Greenline was junior to
the priority position of Lewiston State Bank. See Memorandum Decision dated February 25,
2005, TR atpg 289, Appellant's Addendum, pg. 8.
II.

GREENLINE FAILED TO PRESERVE ITS CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE RELIED ON POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS OF
FAIRNESS AND EQUITY.

Greenline's Brief of Appellant fails to adequately cite the trial record as required by Rule
24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, making it difficult to determine where Greenline
preserved the issues it argues on appeal. An issue is preserved for appeal when a party timely
brings the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court with an opportunity to
rule on the merits. The Court of Appeals cannot consider issues raised for the first time on
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appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. See York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Based upon review of the trial record, it appears that Greenline failed to present the policy
justification arguments to the trial court. See Brief of Appellant, pg. 31 - 39. Greenline should
not be allowed to argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court should have relied on
policy justifications of fairness and equity to extend purchase money priority status to its position
with the collateral when such issues were not presented first to the trial court. Greenline failed to
preserve these issues on appeal and is now precluded from making such arguments. Id.
Furthermore, to the extent that public policy considerations are properly before this Court,
if the Utah Court of Appeals were to adopt Greenline's position it would reverse a significant
component of the UCC's "first to file" rules that provide certainty as to the priority rights of
intervening lien holders in the credit industry and would likewise nullify the UCC's "assignment"
provisions altogether. The technical rules of the UCC must be followed just as the strict
provisions of the Utah real property recording statute. The credit industry demands reliance upon
the provisions of the UCC, otherwise chaos in the banking and lending industry would result
where any unrelated third-party could supersede a bona-fide secured priority interest by paying
minimal value and ignoring the assignment and filing requirements of the UCC. A lender could
never rely on the UCC filings to determine lien priority prior to extending a loan. There has been
absolutely no evidence submitted by Greenline that its position and chaotic result is supported by
the legislative intent when Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c) was adopted.
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DDL

GREENLINE FAILED TO "MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE" SUPPORTING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT ITS FINANCING
TRANSACTION WAS NOT A "REFINANCE^ ENTITLED TO PURCHASE
MONEY PRIORITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c).

Greenline has failed to "marshal the evidence" supporting the trial court's conclusion that
its subsequent financing transaction was not a "refinance" entitled to purchase money priority
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c). Such finding by the trial court and application of the
legal standard at issue was "extremely fact-sensitive" as evidenced by the trial court's
Memorandum Decision dated February 25, 2005. See Memorandum Decision dated February
25, 2005, TR atpg. 289, Appellant's Addendum, pg. 11.
If a determination of correctness of a trial court's application of a legal standard in
extremely fact sensitive, the appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence. See Chen v. Stewart,
100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence,
the appellant must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every piece of competent
evidence which supports the findings that the appellant resists. See Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). When an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appeal fails and must
be rejected. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 1998).
Greenline failed to marshal the evidence in the Brief of Appellant and failed to cite in
comprehensive fashion the evidence that support's the trial court's determination that Greenline
was not entitled to purchase money priority under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c), such as
the absence of assignment documents between New Holland and Greenline and the absence of
any reference in Greenline's financing documents evidencing the intent of the parties to maintain
the PMSI. See Memorandum Decision dated February 25, 2005, TR atpg 289, Appellant's
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Addendum, pg. 15. Absent meeting its obligations to marshal the evidence, Greenline's appeal
must be rejected. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,434 (Utah 1998).
IV- THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY FAILING TO RULE THAT
LEWISTON STATE BANK WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST GREENLINE AS
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
In its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Damages,
Lewiston State Bank asserted two arguments for an award of attorney's fees and costs against
Greenline, The first argument asserted that the claim for reasonable attorney fees and costs was
supported by Greenline's continuing bad faith defense in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56 having knowingly converted the collateral and/or sales proceeds after receiving notice of
Plaintiffs priority lien status. See Memorandum in Support, TR atpg. 305. This claim was
clearly rejected by the trial court as there was insufficient evidence. See Memorandum Decision
dated June 29, 2005, TR at pg. 327, Appellant's Addendum, pg. 20. Lewiston State Bank also
asserted a second argument for an award of attorney fees and costs arguing that "Plaintiffs claim
for reimbursement of attorney fees and costs is also supported as an element of consequential
damages for Defendant's conversion as it was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff would incur
such fees and costs in being forced to enforce its priority lien rights to disgorge the sale proceeds
from Defendant. See Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992); See also Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989)." See Memorandum in Support, TR at pg.
305.
The trial court utterly failed to consider this second argument for attorney fees and costs in
its Memorandum Decision. See Memorandum Decision dated June 29, 2005, TR at pg. 327,
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Appellant's Addendum, pg. 20. Both the Heslop and Canyon Country Store cases support the
proposition that attorneys fees may be awarded as consequential damages where there is no other
contract or statutory basis so long as such damages are reasonably foreseeable.
In the present action, Greenline knew of Lewiston State Bank's priority claims as early as
March 25, 2002, when "Mr. Jay Pickrell and Mr. Mike Phillips, representatives of Defendant
Greenline, contacted Plaintiff to determine whether Plaintiff was willing to give up its priority
secured position in the Collateral and Plaintiff responded that it was going to retain its secured
positions." See Affidavit of Anthony Jon Hall, para. 15, filed in support of Plaintiffs original
Motion for Summary Judgment, TR at pg. 61.
Further, "That on or about April 17, 2003, Mr. Ronald E. Mumford sent a demand letter to
Defendant Greenline regarding the combines, again placing said Defendant on notice of its
superior lien position regarding the combines as being part of the Collateral, and made demand for
payment or to make such Collateral available for repossession and sale by Plaintiff." A copy of
this letter is attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit "H" and is incoiporated by this reference.
See Affidavit of Anthony Jon Hall, para. 14, filed in support of Plaintiffs original Motion for
Summary Judgment, TR at pg. 61.
That despite the verbal and written demands upon Greenline, the sale of the collateral to third
parties was only finally disclosed in the Second Affidavit of Jay Pickrell, which is the only notice
Lewiston State Bank has received regarding the status and whereabouts of the collateral and ultimate
sale, which occurred without notice to Lewiston State Bank despite various requests for such
information. See Affidavit of Ronald E. Mumford, para. 12, filed in support of Plaintiffs original
Motion for Summary Judgment, TRatpg. 199.
14

Despite having actual notice of Lewiston State Bank's interest in the collateral at issue,
Greenline failed to disclose the whereabouts of the collateral and sold such collateral without the
consent of Lewiston State Bank. Greenline's conversion of the collateral was intentional and it
was reasonably foreseeable that Lewiston State Bank would incur such attorney fees and costs in
being forced to enforce its priority lien rights to disgorge the sale proceeds from Greenline, as
Lewiston State Bank gave notice it would do so.
Additionally, the third party tort rule confirmed in South Sanpitch Company v. Pack, 765
P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) has similar application to this case. The present action is a
tort action involving the conversion of the collateral and sales proceeds by Greenline and its
financing transaction with Eli M. Pali and Bart P. Pali and ultimate sale of the collateral. The
"natural consequence" of Greenline's actions in failing to turn over the collateral or sales proceeds
when requested was this litigation brought by Lewiston State Bank for conversion and
disgorgement.
Based upon the forgoing, the trial court committed error and should have awarded to
Lewiston State Bank its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred against Greenline. See
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992); See also Canyon Country Store v. Braceyt
781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); See also South Sanpitch Company v. Pack 765 P.2d 1279, 1282
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). On that same basis, Lewiston State Bank should likewise be awarded its
attorney fees and costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore stated, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed as to its
determination that Greenline was not entitled to purchase money priority status under Utah Code

15

Ann. § 70A-9a-103(6)(c), and confirming the monetary award of damages plus interest against
Greenline. The trial court's judgment regarding its decision not to award of attorney fees and
costs to Lewiston State Bank at trial should be reversed as it should be awarded its attorney fees
and costs at trial and as incurred on appeal.
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ADDENDUM
No addendum in necessary pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) and Rule 24(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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